Subsequent Remedial Measures and the Application of California Law in a Diversity Action by Ogburn, Daniel
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 39 | Number 2 Article 8
1-1-1999
Subsequent Remedial Measures and the
Application of California Law in a Diversity Action
Daniel Ogburn
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Daniel Ogburn, Comment, Subsequent Remedial Measures and the Application of California Law in a Diversity Action, 39 Santa Clara
L. Rev. 615 (1999).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol39/iss2/8
SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES AND THE
APPLICATION OF CALIFORNIA LAW IN A
DIVERSITY ACTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine yourself and a friend are exploring the desert
near Mojave, California in your friend's International Scout.
The Scout is a sport utility vehicle manufactured by Interna-
tional Harvester that is similar to a jeep in design and fea-
tures.' As your friend drives down a twenty foot wide road
known as "Nine Mile Canyon Road," the aluminum gearbox
fails. As a result of the failure of the gearbox, your friend
loses control of the vehicle, and both of you plunge 500 feet
over a cliff. You suffer serious injuries from the near fatal
plunge.
After your accident, International Harvester changes the
design of the gearbox housing from aluminum to malleable
iron. Thereafter, you file a products liability suit against In-
ternational Harvester in California state court. International
Harvester has the action removed to federal district court,
because it is incorporated in Delaware.
The key to your case is the evidence of the subsequent
change in the design of the gearbox housing from aluminum
to iron. You contend the use of aluminum for the gearbox
housing was a design defect because of its unsuitable charac-
teristics for such a purpose. Specifically, you allege that the
aluminum gearbox housing suffered from excessive metal fa-
tigue, and that this design defect was corrected by Interna-
tional Harvester after your accident. International Har-
vester made the correction by changing the gearbox housing
to malleable iron, a stronger metal better suited for use in a
gearbox. Is this evidence of a subsequent remedial change to
the gearbox admissible against International Harvester?
1. This hypothetical is loosely based on the facts of Ault v. International
Harvester, 528 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1974).
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Under California law, in a cause of action for strict prod-
ucts liability, a plaintiff may prove a manufacturer's liability
by showing a manufacturer's subsequent remedial measures.!
However, the federal courts treat the admissibility of subse-
quent remedial measures differently. Effective December 1,
1997, Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence3 specifically
excludes the use of subsequent remedial measures in a strict
products liability action to show liability.
4
This change in the federal rule may lead to forum shop-
ping in strict products liability cases based on design defect.5
Under the Supreme Court holding in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins,6 a federal court must apply state substantive law
in a diversity action.7 However, under the Rules Enabling
Act,' the Supreme Court has the power to prescribe rules of
evidence applicable in federal court. The 1997 revision of
Federal Rule of Evidence 407 now puts California Evidence
Code § 1151 in direct conflict with the Federal Rule.9
When a direct conflict between a state and federal rules
of evidence exists, the proper test to determine which rule
applies is no longer the "typical, relatively unguided Erie
choice."" Under the test prescribed in Hanna v. Plumer,"
Rule 407 must be followed in a diversity case unless "the Ad-
visory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their
prima facie judgment that the Rule in question [does not]
transgress [either] the terms of the Enabling Act [or] consti-
2. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1151 (West 1997). Additionally, evidence of the
failure to take remedial measures may also be used under California law to
prove punitive damages. MIGUEL A. MENDEZ, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE WITH
COMPARISON TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, § 4.04 (1993).
3. FED. R. EVID. 407. For a comment arguing that Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 407 should not be applied to strict liability cases prior to the revision of
the Rule, see KAREN A. DILisIo, THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL
MEASURES IN A PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASE, 3 PRODUCTS LIABILITY L.J. 222
(1992) (arguing that a uniform application of the Rule should apply in all cir-
cuits without variation on the admissibility based on state law).
4. FED. R. EVID. 407. See infra Part II.B.1.
5. See infra notes 152-55, 163-65.
6. 304 U.S. 74 (1938).
7. Id. at 78.
8. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1997).
9. See infra Part III.
10. Olympic Sports Prod., Inc. v. Universal Athletic Sales Co., 760 F.2d 910,
913-14 (9th Cir. 1985). See infra Part II.D.
11. 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
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tutional restrictions." 2
The purpose of this comment is to compare Federal Rule
of Evidence 407 with California Evidence Code § 1151 to de-
termine which rule should apply in an action based on Cali-
fornia law and brought in federal court under diversity juris-
diction. It is the position of this comment that California's
section 1151 should prevail. 3 Allowing evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures is a matter of state concern which
helps to define the substantive law of design defect in prod-
ucts liability cases. 4 This policy decision should be effectu-
ated in a case heard in federal court where the claim is based
on California law. 5
This comment will explore the tension between Califor-
nia Evidence Code § 1151 and Federal Rule of Evidence 407.
Specifically, this comment will explore the tension between
the rules in a products liability case for a design defect in a
diversity action based on California substantive law. Part II
will begin with a brief overview of products liability law in
California.'6 Additionally, Part II will provide the rationale of
both California's section 1151, which permits the admission
of evidence of subsequent remedial measures, and Federal
Rule of Evidence 407, which excludes such evidence." Part II
will conclude with an explanation of the choice of law analy-
sis applicable to determine which rule of evidence should be
used in a diversity action. 8
In Part III, the problem of applying Rule 407 in a diver-
sity action will be presented." Part IV analyzes the ap-
proaches used to determine which rule of evidence should
apply in a diversity action in the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits." Finally, Part V proposes that the Ninth Circuit
should adopt the rationale of Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-
Breguet Aviation' and apply section 1151 in a diversity ac-
12. Id. at 471 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 13, 15 (1941)).
13. See infra Part V.
14. See infra Part IV.B.
15. See infra Part IV.B.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. 727 F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1984).
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tion based on California law.22
II. BACKGROUND
This part begins with an explanation of products liability
law as it applies to design defects in California law.23 It then
presents California's section 1151, which prohibits the use of
evidence of subsequent remedial measures to show negli-
gence.24 The inapplicability of section 1151 to strict products
liability will be outlined in a discussion of Ault v. Interna-
tional Harvester.25 Rule 407 will then be discussed, along
with a brief history of the Rule.26 Following the discussion of
the federal rule, the approaches of the Seventh, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits to the question of whether evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures is admissible to show liability will
be outlined.27 Finally, this part explains the choice of law
analysis applicable in the Ninth Circuit as stated in Olympic
Sports Products, Inc. v. Universal Athletic Sales Co.28
A. Design Defect in Strict Products Liability Actions Under
California Law
In products liability cases for a design defect, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has promulgated a test of liability for a
manufacturer. This test was stated in Barker v. Lull Engi-
neering, Inc.29 Under the Barker test,
22. See infra Part V.
23. See infra Part II.A.
24. See infra Part II.B.1.
25. 528 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1974). See infra Part II.B.2.
26. See infra Part II.C.1.
27. See infra Parts II.C.2, 3, & 4, respectively.
28. 760 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1985). See infra Part IID.
29. 573 P.2d 443, 446 (Cal. 1978). The plaintiff, a forklift operator, was in-
jured when a lift built by the defendant overturned, causing a piece of lumber
to fall from the upraised lift and strike the plaintiff. See id. at 447. The plain-
tiff argued that the forklift was defective due to the failure of defendant to in-
clude mechanical arms called "outriggers" in the design of the lift in order to
compensate for the instability the machine suffered when lifting loads. See id.
at 448. Plaintiff also asserted that the design of the machine was defective
since the machine had no seat belts to secure the operator, nor a roll bar to
form a cage around the operator while operating the machine. See id. at 448-
49. The defendant argued there was no defect in the machine, but rather the
plaintiffs inexperience in operating the machine caused the plaintiffs injuries.
See id. Plaintiff appealed from a defense verdict, claiming error in the jury in-
struction stating, "strict liability for a defect in design ... is based on a finding
that the product was unreasonably dangerous for its intended use." Id. The
Barker court agreed with the plaintiff and extended the court's rejection of the
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a product is defective in design (1) if the plaintiff demon-
strates that the product failed to perform as safely as an
ordinary consumer would expect when used in an in-
tended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) if the
plaintiff proves that the product's design proximately
caused his injury and the defendant fails to prove.., that
on balance the benefits of the challenged design outweigh
the risk of danger inherent in such [a] design. 0
The burden is initially on the plaintiff. In order to show
that a product is defective, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the product did not "perform as safely as an ordinary
consumer would expect."3' The product failure must be
shown to have occurred "when used in an intended or rea-
sonably foreseeable manner." 2
Alternatively, the plaintiff may prove that the design of
the product "proximately caused his injury."" If so, then the
burden shifts to the defendant.4 The defendant must then
prove that on comparison, that "the benefits of the challenged
design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such a de-
sign. "P)5
California adopted a broad interpretation of the term
"defect," specifically rejecting the majority definition found in
the Restatement of Torts. 6 The Barker court rejected the Re-
Restatement definition of a product defect to design defect cases. See Barker v.
Lull Eng'g, Inc., 573 P.2d 443, 450-51 (Cal. 1978).
30. Id. at 457.
31. Barker v. Lull Eng'g, Inc., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. Id. Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, Second reads:
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Con-
sumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to li-
ability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or con-
sumer, or to his property, if:
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the use or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or en-
tered into any contractual relation with the seller.
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statement approach for a number of reasons. 37  First, the
Barker court noted that the Restatement confined "the appli-
cation of strict liability to an article which is dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordi-
nary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowl-
edge common to the community as to its characteristics."38
The Barker court "flatly rejected" this limitation based on the
knowledge of the defect by the consumer:
We. . . refus[e] to permit the low esteem in which the
public might hold a dangerous product to diminish the
manufacturer's responsibilities caused by that prod-
uct .... [O]ur rejection of the use of the 'unreasonably
dangerous' terminology in Cronin rested in part on a con-
cern that a jury might interpret such an instruction, as the
Restatement drafters had indeed intended, as shielding a
defendant from liability so long as the product did not fall
below the ordinary consumer's expectations as to the
product's safety .... [T]he dangers posed by such a mis-
conception by the jury extend to cases involving design de-
fects ... indeed, the danger of confusion is perhaps more
pronounced in design cases in which the manufacturer
could frequently argue that its product satisfied ordinary
consumer expectations since it was identical to other items
of the same product line with which the consumer may
well have been familiar.39
The court held that the "unreasonably dangerous" defini-
tion of the Restatement was "flawed" because "it treats such
consumer expectations as a 'ceiling' on a manufacturer's re-
sponsibility under strict liability principles, rather than as a
'floor.'... [A]t a minimum a product must meet ordinary
consumer expectations as to safety to avoid being found de-
fective.""
Additionally, the court held a jury is not limited to con-
sidering the intended use of the product in determining
whether or not the product is defective." "[T]he adequacy of
a product must be determined in light of its reasonably fore-
seeable use. [T]he design and manufacture of products
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
37. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g, Inc., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978).
38. Id. at 451 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A cmt. I
(1965)).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 451 & n.7.
41. See id. at 452 & n.9
620 [Vol. 39
1999] SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES 621
should not be carried out in an industrial vacuum but with
recognition of the realities of their everyday use."'42
In response to the inadequacies of the Restatement test
of liability for design defects, the court promulgated a dual
standard for determining design defect liability.43 The pur-
pose of this "two pronged" test is to focus "the trier of fact's
attention on the adequacy of the product itself, rather than
on the manufacturer's conduct."44 Additionally, the burden of
proof is placed on the "manufacturer, rather than the plain-
tiff, to establish that because of the complexity of, and trade-
offs implicit in, the design process, an injury-producing prod-
uct should nevertheless not be found defective."" The Barker
court thus emphasized the difference in strict liability cases:
the plaintiff is relieved of "many of the onerous burdens in-
herent in a negligence cause of action."46
Under the first prong of the test, a product may be defec-
tively designed "if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product
failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would
expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable
manner."47 Under the second prong of the test, a product may
be found defective if "through hindsight the jury determines
that the product's design embodies 'excessive preventable
danger,' or, in other words, if the jury finds that the risk of
danger inherent in the challenged design outweighs the bene-
fits of such design."48 Even if a product satisfies the first
prong of the test, the jury may still consider the product un-
der the second prong and find the manufacturer strictly li-
able on balance.49 Thus, the Barker test provides an alterna-
tive test for strict product liability claims, under which a
product may be found to be defective under either prong of a
two pronged approach.
Also, the Barker test shifts the burden of proof from the
plaintiff to the manufacturer." Once the plaintiff makes a
42. Id. (quoting Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Cal.
1972)).
43. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g, Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455-56 (Cal. 1978).
44. Id. at 456.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 455.
47. Barker v. Lull Eng'g, Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455-56 (Cal. 1978).
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. See id. at 456.
50. Id. at 455.
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showing that the product's design is the proximate cause of
his injury, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove the
product is not defective."
The allocation of such [a] burden is particularly significant
in this context inasmuch as this court's product liability
decisions, from Greenman to Cronin, have repeatedly em-
phasized that one of the principle purposes behind the
strict product liability doctrine is to relieve the injured
plaintiff of many of the onerous evidentiary burdens in-
herent in a negligence cause of action. Because most of
the evidentiary matters which may be relevant to the de-
termination of the adequacy of a product's design under
the 'risk-benefit' standard e.g., the feasibility and cost of
alternative designs are similar to issues typically pre-
sented in a negligent design case and involve technical
matters peculiarly within the knowledge of the manufac-
turer, we conclude that once the plaintiff makes a prima
facie showing that the injury was proximately caused by
the product's design, the burden should appropriately shift
to the defendant to prove, in light of other relevant factors,
that the product is not defective. This test ... explicitly
focuses the trier of fact's attention on the adequacy of the
product itself, rather than on the manufacturer's conduct,
and places the burden on the manufacturer, rather than
the plaintiff, to establish that because of the complexity of,
and trade-offs implicit in, the design process, an injury
producing product should nevertheless not be found defec-
tive. 2
A strict products liability case based on a design defect is
distinct from a negligent design case under California law.53
The California Supreme Court stated, "[i]n a strict liability
case, as contrasted with a negligent design action, the jury's
focus is properly directed to the condition of the product it-
self, and not the reasonableness of the manufacturer's con-
duct."
54
Additionally, the Barker court expressly condoned the
comparison of the earlier and later product designs of a
manufacturer in the second prong of the Barker test.55 This
51. See id.
52. Id. at 455-56.
53. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g, Co., 573 P.2d 443, 456 (Cal. 1978).
54. Id. at 457.
55. Id. at 455.
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distinction will be critical in determining whether to apply
the California or federal rule regarding evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures in a diversity action. 6
B. The Use of Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures
Under California State Law
1. California Evidence Code § 1151
California Evidence Code § 1151 states: "[wihen, after
the occurrence of an event, remedial or precautionary meas-
ures are taken, which, if taken previously, would have tended
to make the event less likely to occur, evidence of such subse-
quent measures is inadmissible to prove negligence or culpa-
ble conduct in connection with the event."
57
Section 1151 prohibits the use of subsequent remedial
measures to prove negligence or culpable conduct. 58  Thus,
evidence of subsequent design cases may not be used to prove
negligence under California law. This evidence is not consid-
ered irrelevant; it may be compelling in the eyes of a jury in
that it would constitute an admission of wrongdoing on be-
half of the defendant.59 The purpose of section 1151 is to
avoid discouraging people "from making repairs after the oc-
currence of an accident." °
2. Ault v. International Harvester Allows Evidence of
Subsequent Remedial Measures in Strict Products
Liability Actions
In Ault v. International Harvester Co.,"' the plaintiff was
injured as a passenger in a "Scout," a sport utility vehicle
manufactured by the defendant.62 On November 8, 1964,
while traversing a road in the Mojave Desert at about ten to
fifteen miles per hour, the driver lost control of the vehicle. 3
56. See infra Part V. Under the choice of law provisions explained in Part
V, infra, the substantive law applied in a diversity case should be California
law. See infra Part V.
57. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1151 (West 1997).
58. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1151 (West 1997).
59. See MIGUEL A. MENDEZ, EVIDENCE: THE CALIFORNIA CODE AND THE
FEDERAL RULES A PROBLEM APPROACH 96 (2d ed. 1995).
60. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1151 law revision committee cmt. (West 1997).
61. 528 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1974).
62. Id. at 1149.
63. See id. at 1150.
623
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The vehicle plunged over the side of a canyon, falling 500 feet
to the canyon floor.64
After the accident, it was determined that the gearbox
was broken. 5 Plaintiff alleged the gearbox failure made the
vehicle lose control and caused his resulting injuries.6 6 To
support his argument, plaintiff asserted that the gearbox,
made from Aluminum 380,6" was an unsuitable design due to
the aluminum's excessive metal fatigue. The plaintiff argued
that malleable iron was a safer material from which to con-
struct the gearbox because it would be less likely to fail.68
Plaintiff sought to show that the defendant had in fact sub-
stituted malleable iron for Aluminum 380 in 1967, three
years after the accident took place. 69 The lower court found
in favor of the plaintiff on the basis that the design was de-
fective.70 The defendant then appealed from a verdict, argu-
ing that section 1151 excluded the evidence of the metal
change and that its admission as evidence was an error.'
The California Supreme Court held the evidence was
properly admitted because section 1151 did not apply in an
action based on strict liability.72 The court's rationale for al-
lowing the subsequent change in design was simple: section
1151 only applied to negligence and other culpable conduct
causes of action.8
The Ault court found that the purpose of section 1151
was to exclude evidence of irrelevant, post-accident conduct
when proving the defendant's negligence at the time of the
accident. 74 The policy of excluding such evidence was neces-
sary to encourage individuals to make repairs or improve-
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. Aluminum "380" refers to the industrial grade of aluminum. For exam-
ples of aluminum used in current production vehicles, see Aluminum Assoc.,
Aluminum Applications for Cars and Light Trucks, (visited Jan. 29, 1999)
<http://www.aluminum.org/default3.cfm/30/76/2?CFID=2302828CFTOKEN=323
48>. Note that none of the vehicles in production listed on this site have alu-
minum steering gearboxes. Id.
68. See Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Cal.
1974).
69. See id.
70. See id at 1149.
71. See id. at 1149-50.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1150-51.
74. Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Cal. 1974).
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ments once an accident has occurred.75 However, the court
found this "anti-deterrent" function of the rule had no compa-
rable role in a products liability case. The court held that it
would be unrealistic for a manufacturer to not make design
changes to correct a defect when the possibility of additional
lawsuits and the loss of goodwill might occur if no changes
were made."6 Additionally, the court found that the exclusion
of such changes does not affect the manufacturers' "primary
conduct," but merely serves as a "shield against potential li-
ability." The court stated:
[t]he contemporary corporate mass producer of goods, the
normal products liability defendant, manufactures tens of
thousands of units of goods; it is manifestly unrealistic to
suggest that such a producer will forego making improve-
ments in its product, and risk innumerable additional law-
suits and the attendant adverse effect upon its public im-
age, simply because evidence of adoption of such
improvement may be admitted in an action founded upon
strict liability for recovery on an injury that preceded the
improvement. ... The exclusionary rule of section 1151
does not affect the primary conduct of the mass producer
of goods, but serves merely as a shield against potential li-
ability.
77
The court found that the policy of encouraging repairs by
excluding subsequent remedial measures was of "doubtful
validity" when it would be in the manufacturer's own finan-
cial interest to produce safer goods.7 ' Therefore, subsequent
75. See id. at 1151 (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE § 1151 law revision committee
cmt.).
76. Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1152 & n.4 (Cal.
1974). California courts have acted repeatedly to eliminate such "shields
against potential liability." In Barker, the California Supreme Court stated
that the Restatement test of design defect was unacceptable because the
"reasonable expectations" language of 402A served as a "shield against poten-
tial liability." Barker v. Lull Eng'g, Inc., 573 P.2d 443, 451 (Cal. 1978). This
"shield against potential liability" had been previously rejected by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in the context of manufacturing defects in Cronin v. J.B.E.
Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121 (1972). Barker, 573 P.2d 443, 450 (Cal. 1978).
77. Ault, 528 P.2d at 1152.
78. Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1152(Cal. 1974).
The court further quotes note four of the decision:
it can be argued that evidence of subsequent repairs encourages future
remedial action. A distributor of mass-produced goods may have thou-
sands of goods on the market. If his products are defective, the dis-
tributor would probably face greater total liability by allowing such de-
fective products to remain on the market or by continuing to put more
625
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remedial repairs were not likely to discourage changes in
light of their financial interests at stake, and evidence of sub-
sequent remedial repairs were thus admissible in a strict
products liability case to show liability."9
C. The Approaches of the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits
to Federal Rule of Evidence 407
1. Federal Rule of Evidence 407
The current Federal Rule of Evidence 407, effective De-
cember 1, 1997, states:
[w]hen, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an
event, measures are taken that, if taken previously, would
have made the injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence
of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove
negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in product, a defect
in a product's design, or a need for a warning or instruc-
tion. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence
of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose,
such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of pre-
cautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment. °
defective products on the market than he would by being adjudged li-
able in one particular case where evidence of subsequent repairs was
introduced. Also, concern on the part of distributors for consumer pro-
tection is promoted by consumer organizations, federal agencies, and
mass market exposure of product defects. To some extent, the eco-
nomic self interest of product distributors requires that they repair
and improve defective products to avoid adverse publicity which might
result from future litigation .... [E]xcluding evidence of subsequent
repairs to encourage future remedial action may preclude recovery un-
der theories of products liability which are themselves designed to en-
sure safety in marketed products. Relevant evidence should not be ex-
cluded from a products liability case by an obsolete evidentiary rule
when modern legal theories, accompanied by economic and political
pressures, will achieve the desired policy goals.
Id. at n.4 (quoting Note, Products Liability and Evidence of Subsequent Re-
pairs, DUKE L.J. 837, 845-52 (1972)).
79. See id.
80. FED. R. EVID. 407 (emphasis added). This revision of Rule 407 was ef-
fective December 1, 1997. FED. R. EVID. 407. The prior version of Rule 407 was
as follows:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously,
would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subse-
quent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable con-
duct in connection with the event. This rule does not require the ex-
clusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another
purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precau-
tionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
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Rule 407 was originally drafted to adopt "generally ac-
cepted" law.81 The rule first appeared in the Model Code of
Evidence,82 and the original version of the Federal Rule of
Evidence was nearly identical to section 1151 of the Califor-
nia Evidence Code. 3 The federal Rule was adopted to carry
forward the common law policy of promoting safety by al-
lowing an alleged tort-feasor to take steps to prevent the re-
occurrence of an accident.84 Therefore, such evidence of sub-
sequent repair could not be used to show that the tortfeasor
was negligent.85 The wisdom of the Rule has been doubted
over the years by several commentators. 86
The basis of Rule 407 has been said to be a consideration
of social policy.87 In this sense the Rule has been called a
"quasi privilege."88 As such, Rule 407 arguably promotes the
FED. R. EVID. 407.
81. See 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5282 (1980).
82. See id. The Model of Code of Evidence, Rule 308 stated:
Evidence of the taking of a precaution by a person to prevent the repe-
tition of a previous harm or the occurrence of a similar harm or evi-
dence of the adoption of a plan requiring that such a precaution be
taken is inadmissible as tending to prove that his failure to take such a
precaution to prevent the previous harm was negligent.
Id. & n.9. The Uniform Rule of Evidence, from which the first sentence of the
Rule was originally modeled after, stated: "[w]hen after the occurrence of an
event remedial or precautionary measures are taken, which, if taken previously
would have tended to make the event less likely to occur, evidence of such sub-
sequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in
connection with the event." Id. & n.11.
83. Id. at n.14. California Evidence Code § 1151 is identical to the Uniform
Rules of Evidence 51 except that "not admissible" was substituted for the word
"inadmissible" in Section 1151. Id.
84. See id.
85. See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, JR., supra note 81. The basis of the Rule
originated in an English case, Hart v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry. Co., 21
L.T.R. 261 (1869). Id. at n.6.
86. See id. See generally Andrea Lynne Flink, Note, Admissibility of Sub-
sequent Remedial Measures Evidence in Diversity Actions Based on Strict Prod-
ucts Liability, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1485 (1985) (arguing that generally that the
Erie doctrine requires deference to state policy decisions).
87. See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, JR., supra note 81.
88. Id. This is not the only basis for which the Rule has been said to be
based upon. See id. The Rule was originally based on the concept of relevance,
and this was the basis relied upon by the Supreme Court in Columbia & Puget
Sound Ry. Co. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 207 (1892) (arguing that such evi-
dence is of little probative value because precautions for the future are not ad-
missions of past failures, and as evidence of such remedial measures only serve
to distract the minds of the jury and create an undue prejudice against a defen-
dant). This view has been in decline for some time. See id.
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policy of "encouraging people to take precautionary measures
after an accident by assuring them that such evidence cannot
be used as evidence of past negligence."89
As of December 1, 1997, Rule 407 excludes evidence of
subsequent repairs in a strict products liability cause of ac-
tion, officially adopting the position of a majority of the fed-
eral circuits." Rule 407 explicitly excludes the use of subse-
quent measures to prove a defect in a product or in a
product's design." However, Rule 407 is limited to evidence
of measures taken by the defendant after the injury-
producing event has occurred. "Evidence of measures taken
by the defendant prior to the 'event' causing 'injury or harm'
do not fall within the exclusionary scope of Rule 407 even if
they occurred after the manufacture or design of the prod-
uct."
92
Thus, Rule 407, which once paralleled section 1151, has
now been placed in opposition to section 1151. Ironically,
Rule 407 was based on the rationale that people should be
able to make repairs without fear of being confronted by such
repairs in a future negligence claim, just as section 1151 pro-
vides. However, while section 1151 specifically limited this
rationale to negligence claims, Rule 407 extends this ration-
ale to strict products liability.
2. The Seventh Circuit in Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co.
The advisory committee for the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence cited, inter alia, Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co.9' as a
89. Id.
90. FED. R. EVID. 407 Advisory Committee Notes. See also JACK B.
WEINSTEIN ET AL., 2 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 407.01 (Joseph M.
McLaughlin, ed. 2d ed. 1997) ("The general purpose of these amendments is to
extend the effect of the subsequent remedies rule to product liability actions
and to clarify that the rule applies only to remedial measures made after the
occurrence that produced the damages giving rise to the action [Report of the
Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (1996)]").
91. FED. R. EVID. 407. Note that the revised rule only applies to measures
taken after the occurrence of the event in question, but not after the purchase
of the product. See id.; see also infra note 90.
92. FED. R. EVID. 407 Advisory Committee Notes. See also Chase v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 17, 21-22 (4th Cir. 1988). For a comment arguing
that the rule should exclude all evidence of measures taken after the manufac-
ture or design of the product, see Thais A. Richardson, Comment, The Proposed
Amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 407: A Subsequent Remedial Measure
That Does Not Fix the Problem, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1453 (1996).
93. 733 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1984).
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majority opinion excluding evidence of subsequent repairs."
In Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co.,9 the plaintiff, Forrest
Flaminio, brought a diversity action in federal court against
Honda Motor Company for personal injuries he suffered on a
Honda "Gold Wing" motorcycle.96 Plaintiff sued both Ameri-
can Honda Motor Company (American Honda), the motorcy-
cle distributor, and Honda Motor Company of Japan
(Japanese Honda), the motorcycle manufacturer.97 The plain-
tiff was injured a few days after he purchased the motorcycle
when he decided to ride it after a few drinks.98 Upon reach-
ing a speed of fifty to seventy miles per hour, the front wheel
of the motorcycle began to wobble.99 When the plaintiff
leaned back to determine what the problem was, the motor-
cycle began to wobble uncontrollably, resulting in a crash and
injuries that left the plaintiff a paraplegic. 100
The plaintiff alleged that both Japanese Honda and
American Honda had defectively designed the front struts of
the motorcycle, causing the front wheel to wobble."' At trial,
the jury found Japanese Honda not liable, but American
Honda negligent."2 American Honda was determined to be
thirty percent at fault for the accident, and plaintiff was de-
termined to be seventy percent at fault.0 3 Therefore, under
Wisconsin law,' which governed the underlying claim, plain-
tiff was not entitled to recovery since his negligence was
greater than that of the person against whom recovery was
94. FED. R. EVID. 407 Advisory Committee Notes. See also In re Joint E.
Dist. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 995 F.2d 343
(2d Cir. 1993); Kelly v. Crown Equipment Co., 970 F.2d 1273, 1275 (3d Cir.
1992); Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1522 (1st Cir. 1991); Gauth-
ier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634, 636 (9th Cir. 1986; Grenada Steel Industries,
Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., Inc., 695 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1983); Cann v. Ford
Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982);
Werner v. Upjohn, Inc., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080
(1981); Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengetsellschaft, 621 F.2d 230, 232 (6th
Cir. 1980). Flaminio and Gauthier will be discussed, infra.
95. 733 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1984).
96. Id. at 465.
97. Id. at 463.
98. See id. at 465.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 465 (7th Cir. 1984).
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. Id. at 466.
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sought.'o5
The plaintiff appealed his case. °6 Among other argu-
ments,"7 plaintiff asserted that the court improperly excluded
two blueprints showing changes in the struts of the motorcy-
cle."°8 These changes included a two millimeter increase in
the diameter of the struts by Japanese Honda to eliminate
the wobble which plaintiff asserted had caused his injuries109
The appellate court held the exclusion of the blueprints was
proper under Rule 407.10 Under Wisconsin law,"' however, a
similar state rule of evidence is inapplicable in products li-
ability cases."2
Judge Posner, writing the opinion for the appellate court,
expressed the court's rationale for applying Rule 407. First,
the court concluded that it must reject the evidence because
"culpable conduct" was at issue in the case."' Wisconsin law
provided that the defendants' blameworthiness must be com-
pared against that of the plaintiffs in a strict liability case,
even if the defendant was not blameworthy in a negligence
sense, in order to determine if the plaintiff may recover at
all.1
4
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. The plaintiff argued that the district court judge failed to properly in-
struct the jury regarding a finding of failure to warn. Flaminio v. Honda Motor
Co., 733 F.2d 463, 466 (7th Cir. 1984). The plaintiff also argued that the dis-
trict court erred in instructing the jury that the Honda corporations, as parent
and subsidiary, were one and the same, for purposes of determining compari-
tive negligence. Id.
108. Id. at 468.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See supra note 104.
112. Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 469-70 (7th Cir. 1984).
With respect to the choice of law decision, see Part II.D & IVA, infra.
113. Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 469-70 (7th Cir. 1984).
114. See id. at 469. Judge Posner found that Flaminio's argument that Rule
407 did not apply since his strict product liability claim did not involve Honda's
culpability was mislaid. Id. Judge Posner determined that Wisconsin law
made the rule applicable since its law required that defendant Honda's blame-
worthiness had to be compared to Flaminio's, even though Honda was not
blameworthy in the negligence sense. Id. (citing Dippel v. Sciano, 155 N.W. 2d
55, 64-65 (1967). In this sense, Rule 407's purpose of promoting safety through
encouraging repairs is still accomplished by applying the Rule to strict products
liability claims. Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir.
1984). Judge Posner found, on balance, that the probability of another accident
like Flaminio's was probably lower than the likelihood of evidence of subse-
quent change being used "devastatingly" against Honda in a products liability
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Second, the court found that if it did not use Federal
Rule of Evidence 407, the Rule's policy of promoting safety
would be threatened because the admission of evidence of
subsequent changes would reduce the defendant's incentive
to make changes to the product.' The court reasoned that
the chance of another accident was less likely than a suit
against the defendant by the injured party."6 Seeing the
greater likelihood of suit by the injured party would deter a
defendant from making changes that could be used
"devastatingly" against a defendant at trial.
11 7
Finally, the court reasoned that under both negligence
and strict liability theories, the safety policy of Rule 407
would be compromised because admission would deter manu-
facturers from making any changes to their products."8 If
subsequent repair evidence were admissible in a strict liabil-
ity case, it may deter manufacturers from making any
changes in their products, even where "the accident may have
been readily avoidable.., by eliminating some defect ....
[T]he failure to apply Rule 407 might deter subsequent re-
medial measures just as much as in a negligence case."".9
3. The Ninth Circuit in Gauthier v. AMF, Inc.
Gauthier v. AMF, Inc."' is the controlling case in the
Ninth Circuit on admissibility of evidence of subsequent re-
case, once Honda was aware of the defect. Id. Thus, the evidence should be
excluded in order to preserve the safety purpose of the rule, rather than allow
the manufacturer to ignore known defects for fear of devastating verdicts at
trial. Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 469-70 (7th Cir. 1984).
115. Id. at 470.
116. Id. at 469.
117. Id.
A major purpose of Rule 407 is to promote safety by removing the dis-
incentive to make repairs (or take other safety measures) after an ac-
cident that would exist if the accident victim could use those measures
as evidence of the defendant's liability. One might think it not only
immoral but reckless for an injurer, having been alerted by the acci-
dent to the existence of danger, not to take steps to correct the danger.
But accidents are low probability events. The probability of another
accident may be much smaller than the probability that the victim of
the accident that has already occurred will sue the injurer and, if per-
mitted, will make devastating use at trial of any measures that the
injurer may have taken since the accident to reduce the danger.
Id.
118. See Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 470 (7th Cir. 1984).
119. Id. See supra note 114.
120. 788 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1986).
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medial repairs. The case was decided under Montana law,
which follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section
402A definition of design defect for products liability cases.'2 '
The case was heard on appeal before Circuit Judges Wallace
and Skopil, and District Judge Henderson.'22 Defendant,
AMF, produced a snow thrower with an exposed impeller
that injured the plaintiff when he put his hand into the dis-
charge chute to unclog the accumulated snow in the ma-
chine. 123
The plaintiff alleged that the lack of a "deadman" device
on the snow thrower constituted a design defect.'24 This de-
vice would stop the thrower's impeller from throwing snow
when the operator's hand left the controls of the thrower.'25
Alternatively, the plaintiff asserted that the design was un-
safe because it lacked a bar or cage to prevent an operator's
hand from contacting the impeller.'26 At trial, plaintiff com-
pared the safety devices of a 1984 Toro snow thrower to de-
fendant AMF's model. After the plaintiff prevailed at trial,
defendant asserted on appeal that evidence of another com-
pany's design was inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 407.
District Judge Henderson, writing the opinion for the
court, rejected the approach of Ault,'27 and adopted the posi-
tion that Rule 407 applies to strict products liability cases in
a diversity action.' 8 Citing to Flaminio,'29 the court held that
"there is no practical difference between strict liability and
negligence in defective design cases,"2 ° and "the public policy
rationale to encourage remedial measures remains the
same."''
3
Thus, Gauthier signifies the Ninth Circuit's decision to
follow the rationale of the Flaminio court and the Seventh
Circuit. By accepting the policy rationale of promoting safety
121. See id. at 635.
122. See id. at 634. District Judge Henderson, from the Northern District of
California, was sitting by designation on this case. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1986).
126. See id.
127. Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1974).
128. Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634, 637 (9th Cir. 1986).
129. Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 470 (7th 1984).
130. Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634, 637 (9th Cir. 1986).
131. Id.
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by encouraging repairs, the Ninth Circuit adopted by refer-
ence the rationale expressed by Judge Posner in Flaminio.
4. The Tenth Circuit in Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-
Breuget Aviation
In Moe, the families of passengers killed in a plane crash
sued the defendant, an aircraft manufacturer, in an action
based on strict products liability for failure to warn. '2 The
airplane, a Falcon 10 model, had been thoroughly tested and
certified to fly by the Federal Aviation Administration in
1973.13 It had been in continuous service of the decedent's
employer, Mountain Bell, for two and a half years prior to the
crash, with no history of hydraulic or artificial feel systems
problems.
On the morning of the crash, the airplane took off and
ascended to an altitude of 12,000 feet. '5 Upon reaching
12,000 feet, the oxygen masks inside the plane fell due to a
ground mechanic's failure to reset the circuit breaker to the
masks upon inspection.' After requesting permission to re-
turn to the airport, the pilot experienced difficulty with the
controls of the airplane. The pilot completed two 360 degree
turns and radioed the tower with a "may day" call, advising
the tower that the plane was "out of control."'1 7 After com-
pleting the turns, the plane flew straight for seven miles, and
the pilot then requested a landing vector.18 Fifteen seconds
later the plane crashed in a wheat field killing all but one
passenger and destroying the plane."9
The plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that the
autopilot was defective. *° Plaintiffs' experts testified that if
the autopilot is engaged and the pilot attempted to manually
132. See Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 920
(10th Cir. 1984).
133. See id.
134. See id. The "artificial feels system" is the autopilot system in the air-
craft. Id.
135. See id. at 921.
136. See id. The oxygen mask malfunction was not argued to be the cause of
the crash. Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 920
(10th Cir. 1984). It was merely the event that triggered the pilot's decision to
return to the ground for repairs. Id.
137. See id. at 921.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
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fly the plane, the autopilot would have responded exactly op-
posite to the pilot's inputs.' In the Falcon 10 model, there
was no clear warning that the autopilot was still engaged af-
ter the pilot attempted to disengage it by using the disengage
switch on the yoke. 4 '
Plaintiffs appealed the inadmissibility of a document,
called "Newsflash 16,"'" which was published in 1978 after
the crash of the aircraft, and described the need to warn of a
known defect in the aircraft.' The trial court had excluded
the document, stating that the plaintiffs alleged causes of ac-
tion based on negligence and failure to warn.'45 Since negli-
gence and failure to warn were similar theories of liability,
the trial court held Rule 407 applied equally to both, thus ex-
cluding the use of the "Newsflash" as evidence of the defen-
dant's liability for failure to warn. 4 ' The policy of Rule 407,
the trial court stated, is "not [to] discourage persons from
taking remedial measures.' 47
However, the appellate court disagreed.' The appellate
court held that in the absence of contrary state law, the state
evidentiary law determined admissibility of subsequent re-
medial measures in a diversity case.'49 "It is our view that
141. See Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 921
(10th Cir. 1984).
142. See id.
143. See id. at 930. The Newsflash read:
In the autopilot engaged configuration, the autopilot may fail to disen-
gage when the pilot presses the switch in the control wheel ....
A refusal of the autopilot to disengage, not perceived by the pilot, con-
stitutes an insidious failure which may result in a situation similar to
the resulting from an Horizontal Stabilizer trim runaway. Under the
action of the Automatical Trim, the Horizontal Stabilizer moves in a
direction opposed to that commanded by the pilot. Such a motion is
identified by a slow sounding of the clacker.
Since such a motion can be stopped by the Horizontal stabilizer normal
control, only if the counteraction is maintained, it is advisable to:
1. Rapidly use the emergency Horizontal Stabilizer trim control. Only
this action can definitely stop such a Horizontal Stabilizer motion.
Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 930-31 (10th
Cir. 1984).
144. Id. at 931.
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 931.
148. Id.
149. Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 931
(10th Cir. 1984) (citing Rexrode v. American Laundry Press Co., 674 F.2d 826,
831 (10th Cir. 1982)).
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when state courts have interpreted Rule 407 or its equivalent
state counterpart, the question whether subsequent remedial
measures are excluded from evidence is a matter of state
policy." 5° The Moe court found that the purpose of Rule 407
was to promote state policy in an area of state law, not for
the truth or to facilitate trial proceedings."'
The Moe court held that when such a conflict arises be-
tween the state and federal rule, the state rule controls be-
cause: (1) there is no federal products liability law, (2) the
law of the state where the injury occurs determines the ele-
ments and proof of a products liability action, and these vary
from state to state, and (3) a state rule contrary to Rule 407
is so closely tied to substantive law that it must be applied in
a diversity action to "effect uniformity and to prevent forum
shopping.""
52
The Moe court held that products liability is a state
cause of action "with varying degrees of proof and exclusion
from state to state.""3 It stated that the policy determination
of excluding evidence of subsequent change is thus
"necessarily a state policy matter."" 4 Finally, "[w]here the
state law is expressed in product liability cases, these expres-
sions control the application of Rule 407.""'
The Moe court was aware of the implication of Hanna v.
Plumer"' in its decision to allow state law to control the ad-
mission of evidence of subsequent remedial repairs."7 The
Moe court held that while federal standards of sufficiency
may determine whether evidence may be admissible, the un-
derlying cause of action in a diversity case was controlled by
state law, and thus the "attendant elements and requirement
of proof' were determined by state law."'
150. Moe, 727 F.2d at 931.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 932.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 932
(10th Cir. 1984) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
156. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
157. Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 932
(10th Cir. 1984).
158. Id. The Moe court cited to Hildago Properties, Inc. v. Wachovia Mort-
gage Co., 617 F.2d 196, 198 (10th Cir. 1980), regarding the sufficiency of evi-
dence standard. Id. See supra note 154. The Moe court cited to Safeway Stores
v. Fannan, 308 F.2d 94, 97 (9th Cir. 1962), with respect to the controlling law in
635
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The Moe court found the application of Rule 407 an
"unwarranted excursion into the Erie Doctrine" when Rule
407 was applied in conjunction with Rule 403."' The Moe
court found that since the federal government was a govern-
ment of enumerated powers limited by the Tenth Amend-
ment,"' it may not be constitutionally permissible for Con-
gress to enact a rule to "control a single substantive issue.'
Thus, it was error for the trial court to apply Rule 407 in a
diversity action to exclude evidence of the "Newsflash" since
application of the Rule was in conflict with state law.'6
D. Olympic Sports Choice of Law Analysis Applies to
Determine Which Rule of Evidence Should be Followed in
a Diversity Action Based on California Law
In order to determine whether evidence of subsequent
remedial measures may be admitted in a diversity action, a
choice of law analysis must be completed. The Ninth Circuit
followed the test in Hanna6' when it stated its choice of law
analysis in Olympic Sports Products, Inc. v. Universal Ath-
letic Sales Co.64
Under the principles of Hanna,'65 if a state rule and fed-
eral rule cover the same situation, an analysis based on the
Rules Enabling Act 166 is necessary to determine which rule
the underlying cause of action in a diversity case. Moe, 727 F.2d 917, 932.
159. Id. Essentially, the trial court found that Rule 407 was "not governed
by or made applicable by state law." Id. The Moe court disagreed with the trial
court's ruling "admissibility of evidence in diversity actions is governed exclu-
sively by... the Federal Rules of Evidence." Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-
Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 932 (10th Cir. 1984). Federal Rule of Evidence
403 states: "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, of misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403
160. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
161. Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 933
(10th Cir. 1984) (citing 2 LOUISELL & MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 166).
162. Id. (citing Rexrode v. American Laundry Press Co., 674 F.2d 826, 831
(10th Cir. 1982)).
163. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). See Olympic Sports for a brief review of the choice
of law decisions as shaped by the Court since the announcement of Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 74, 78 (1938). Olympic Sports Prod., Inc. v. Univer-
sal Athletic Sales Co., 760 F.2d 910, 913-4 (9th Cir. 1985).
164. Olympic Sports Prod., Inc. v. Universal Athletic Sales Co., 760 F.2d 910
(9th Cir. 1985).
165. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
166. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1997). The Rules Enabling Act
states:
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applies. 67 When a federal rule and state rule are equally ap-
plicable to an issue, the federal court must apply the federal
rule, and can only refuse to do so if it violates either the
Rules Enabling Act or a constitutional restriction.
However, the Enabling Act is limited by its own words:
"the rules of procedure 'shall not abridge, enlarge or modify
any substantive right.""69  The proper test is "whether the
[federal] rule regulates 'judicial process for enforcing rights
and duties recognized by substantive law."
70
Additionally, because every procedural rule may be
"outcome determinative" 7' at some point in the litigation, the
court should consider the twin aims of Erie: "discouragement
of forum shopping and avoidance of inequitable administra-
tion of the laws."7  According to the Olympic court, "[tjhe
proper query is whether the difference between the two rules
would be relevant to the plaintiffs initial choice of forum.
73
If, in a diversity action there exists a potential for forum
shopping, or the federal rule regulates more than just the
process for adjudicating rights under substantive law, then
the state rule should trump the federal rule.
74
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules
of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United
States district courts (including proceedings before magistrates
thereof) and courts of appeals.
(b) such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or
effect after such rules have taken effect.
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1997) (emphasis added).
167. See Olympic Sports Prod., Inc. v. Universal Athletic Sales Co., 760 F.2d
910, 913 (9th Cir. 1985).
168. See id. at 914.
When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the question
facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided Erie
choice: the court has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and
can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and
Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question
transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional
restrictions.
Id. (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965)).
169. Id. (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965)).
170. Id.
171. To be outcome determinative is to be "able to choose a different outcome
for a lawsuit by filing in federal court rather than in state court." Id. at 913.
172. Olympic Sports Prod., Inc. v. Universal Athletic Sales Co., 760 F.2d 910,
914 (9th Cir. 1985).
173. Id.
174. See id. at 914-15.
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III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
The Ninth Circuit, in Gauthier,'75 held that Federal Rule
of Evidence 407 should apply in a diversity action.'76 This
precedent, applicable to diversity actions in federal court that
apply California law, ignores the policy decisions articulated
by the California Supreme Court under Ault v. International
Harvester.7 7 Thus, evidence of subsequent remedial meas-
ures would be admissible in a strict products liability case
brought in a California state court to show liability. How-
ever, such evidence would not be admissible in a diversity ac-
tion applying California law.
In Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 78 the
Tenth Circuit held that when Colorado state law indicated
that evidence of a subsequent remedial measure is admissi-
ble to show a failure to warn in state court, it was also ad-
missible as a matter of state substantive law in a diversity
case where the underlying cause of action was based on Colo-
rado state law. 179 The Tenth Circuit decided Moe in light of
controlling Colorado state law, which followed the rationale
of Ault v. International Harvester. °
In order to ensure that the public policy as shaped by
California's substantive law' is applied in diversity actions
for design defects in strict products liability, the Ninth Cir-
cuit must necessarily apply the appropriate rationale so that
California's rule of law prevails. The Ninth Circuit may rec-
oncile the difference between Federal Rule 407 and California
Evidence Code § 1151.82 by adopting the rationale of the
Tenth Circuit in Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet
Aviation.'
175. 788 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1986).
176. See id. at 637; see supra Part II.C.4.
177. 528 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1974).
178. 727 F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1984).
179. See id. at 931. Colorado law controlling at the time of decision in Moe
was stated in Good v. A.B. Chance Co., 565 P.2d 217 (Colo. 1977). See id.
180. Id.
181. See supra Part II.A.
182. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1151 (West 1997).
183. 727 F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1984).
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IV. COMPARISON OF THE RATIONALES OF THE SEVENTH,
NINTH AND TENTH CIRCUITS
A. Olympic Sports Choice of Law Analysis Applied to the
Federal and California Rules of Evidence on Subsequent
Remedial Measures
Rule 407 states that evidence of remedial measures
taken subsequent to an injury producing event is "not admis-
sible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a
product, a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warn-
ing or instruction."'84 California Evidence Code § 1151 states
that evidence of remedial measures taken after an injury
producing event is not admissible "to prove negligence or cul-
pable conduct in connection with the event."8 ' Under Ault v.
International Harvester, California Evidence Code § 1151
does not exclude such evidence to prove liability in a strict
products liability case based on a claim of defective design.
Thus, Rule 407 and Section 1151 directly conflict in that Rule
407 prohibits the use of evidence that Section 1151 would al-
low if the same case were being tried under the California
Evidence Code.
Rule 407 was enacted pursuant to the Rules Enabling
Act. 8  The Rules Enabling Act states that the "Supreme
Court shall have the power to prescribe ... general rules of
evidence for cases in the United States district courts .... ""'
The test for whether Rule 407 is validly enacted is the same
as it is for any Federal Rule of Evidence: "whether the rule
regulates 'judicial process for enforcing rights and duties rec-
ognized by substantive law.""88 To date, no rule promulgated
under the Rules Enabling Act has ever been invalidated un-
der this test.9
However, the Olympic'90 court stated that Erie principles
should not be ignored when testing a federal rule under
184. FED. R. EVID. 407.
185. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1151 (West 1997).
186. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1997).
187. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1997).
188. Olympic Sports Prod. Inc., v. Universal Athletic Sales Co., 760 F.2d 910,
914 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965)).
189. See Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 472 (7th Cir. 1984).
190. 760 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1985).
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Hanna.' The court held that the rule in question should be
examined in consideration of the twin aims of Erie: 1) forum
shopping and 2) inequitable administration of the laws.19 2
Under the Olympic query, 93 the difference between Sec
tion 1151 and Rule 407 is relevant to a plaintiffs initial
choice of forum in a strict products liability action based on a
design defect. Where a manufacturer has changed a prod-
uct's design subsequent to the plaintiffs injury, it is the pol-
icy of California to allow evidence of that change to be used to
show liability.14  Thus, a plaintiff has the option of using
such evidence by bringing suit in a California state court. A
defendant would clearly wish to remove to a federal district
court on the basis of diversity, if such a move would avoid the
use of such evidence. This is the very situation the Erie doc-
trine is designed to resolve' 95-by following the state law in a
diversity action. 9 '
B. Design Defect Liability Does not Equal Negligence Under
California Law
The goal of the Ault court was to promote the policy of
safety in products marketed in California.'97 By allowing the
admission of evidence of subsequent remedial measures, the
Ault court defined the state's policy of allowing subsequent
change as evidence to prove the defective design in an unsafe
product.199 The court, recognizing the purpose of section
1151, determined that the policy of excluding conduct had no
place in a strict products liability case since the manufac-
turer's conduct was not at issue under California strict prod-
ucts liability law."' In Ault, the court held that the exclusion
of such evidence would merely shield the defendant from li-
ability, thus hampering the policy goals of product safety. °°
191. See id. at 914 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965)).
192. See id.
193. See id. ("The proper query is whether the difference between the two
rules would be relevant to plaintiffs initial choice of forum.").
194. See Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1974).
195. See Olympic Sports Prod., Inc. v. Universal Athletic Sales Co., 760 F.2d
910 (9th Cir. 1985).
196. Id.
197. Ault, 528 P.2d at 1152.
198. See id. at 1150.
199. See id.
200. Id. California is not alone on this finding. The state of Maine allows
the use of evidence of subsequent remedial measures, and their position on this
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For a product manufacturer, the risk of innumerable addi-
tional lawsuits and the loss of goodwill due to bad publicity
are greater catalysts for change than a rule excluding evi-
dence of subsequent repairs."' In short, any protection ex-
tended to a defendant manufacturer by excluding such evi-
dence in a cause of action based on strict products liability
would be "gratuitous."2 2
Additionally, the definition of design defect in California
under Barker211 is not "equivalent" to a negligence standard,
making the respective cases for negligent design and manu-
facturing distinct from the same case under strict products
liability.0 4 The California Supreme Court in Barker specifi-
cally rejected the 402A test for design defect in favor of its
own two-pronged test that promotes goals of safety.211 Under
this test, the burden of proof that the design was not defec-
tive shifts to the manufacturer, once the plaintiff established
a causal link between the injury and the defective design."'
The purpose of the shift is to "relieve the injured plaintiff of
many of the onerous evidentiary burdens inherent in a negli-
gence cause of action."2 7 Specifically, the Ault court held that
the prohibition of evidence of subsequent remedial measures,
issue was summed up in a similar conclusion (though somewhat different ra-
tionale) when considering this issue:
The assumption that a defendant will not take corrective action be-
cause he knows that it might be used against him is not persuasive. A
defendant as knowledgeable and cold-blooded as the exclusionary rule
suggests would probably be aware of the many exceptions, which would
make it risky to refrain from making needed repairs. Enlightened self
interest would often lead defendants to make repairs despite the pos-
sibility of such action being received on the issue of fault. This would
surely seem true of a structural change by a national manufacturer.
23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, JR., supra note 81.
201. Ault v. International Harvester, 528 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1974).
202. Id.
203. 573 P.2d 443, 450-51(Cal. 1978).
204. Id. The court also states that:
[t]he clear theoretical distinction between these two bases of recovery
(negligence and strict products liability) impelled this court in a recent
decision to hold that contrary to the Restatement (Rest.2d Torts, §
402A), a plaintiff is not required, in order to prevail on the theory of
strict liability, to show that a product is unreasonably dangerous to the
user, and that it is sufficient if he demonstrates that it contained a de-
fect which caused him injury.
Id. at 1150 n.2 (citing Cronin v. J.B.E Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 135 (1972)).
205. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 446 (Cal. 1978).
206. See id. at 454.
207. Id. at 455.
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while applicable in a negligence action, does not apply in a
strict products liability action.2 8 This is consistent with Cali-
fornia policy, since strict products liability cases do not in-
volve conduct based on Barker.°9 Thus, the substantive law
of California for design defect cases in strict products liability
would affect the plaintiffs initial choice of forum.210
Finally, the Barker court recognized that most exhibits of
such evidence relevant to the determination of a design's de-
fectiveness are "technical matters peculiarly within the
knowledge of the manufacturer."' It was the holding of the
Barker court to place the burden on the manufacturer to ex-
plain the complexity of the design process, and the reasons
why tradeoffs of alternative designs should not cause the jury
to find its product defective. ' Without the ability to intro-
duce evidence of subsequent remedial measures taken by a
manufacturer, it would be difficult to get a manufacturer, as
a defendant, to discuss alternative designs that were avail-
able for a product." 3 Thus, the shifting of the burden of proof
under California law would also affect the plaintiffs initial
choice of forum, necessitating a choice of the California rule
in a diversity action.
C. The Rationale of the Tenth Circuit Applied in Moe v.
Avions Marcel Dassault-Breuget Aviation
The court in Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breuget
Aviation"4 found that the state law provision on subsequent
remedial measures should be accepted, regardless of Rule
407, "in order to effect uniformity and prevent forum shop-
208. Ault v. International Harvester, 528 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1974).
209. See id. at 432.
210. See supra, discussion on forum shopping Part IV.A.
211. Barker, 573 P.2d at 455.
212. See id.
213. For example, the plaintiffs strategy in Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co.
was to use evidence of subsequent remedial measures in the strut design
against the manufacturer, Japanese Honda to show liability for defective de-
sign. See Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1984). If the
plaintiff could have shown both American and Japanese Honda liable, he may
have combined their liability in order to show that the defendant, as a single
conglomerate, was more at fault than the plaintiff. If the plaintiff had done so,
and the court agreed that the two Hondas were one company, he may have re-
covered damages for a portion of his claim under Wisconsin law. See id.
214. 727 F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1984).
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ping."215 The Moe court further stated that the decision to
admit or exclude evidence of subsequent remedial measures
is a question of state policy.216 In addition, the Moe court
found that the purpose of Rule 407 is to promote state law in
217
a substantive law area.
Because Rule 407 defines policy in a substantive area of
state law, the Moe court held that the state's interpretation
of the law should apply, for the following reasons:
(a) there is no federal products liability law, (b) the ele-
ments and proof of a products liability action are governed
by the law of the state where the injury occurred and
these may, and do, for policy reasons, vary from state to
state, and (c) an announced state rule in variance with
Rule 407 is so closely tied to the substantive law to which
it relates (product liability) that it must be applied in a di-
versity action in order to effect uniformity and to prevent
2181forum shopping.
The Moe court found that where the state law supplies
the rule for the decision, there is no reason why the federal
rule should be relied upon.29 Additionally, where the state
products liability law is expressed through cases, these cases
control the determination of whether subsequent remedial
measures are admissible.220  Even though Rule 407 may be
applicable in a diversity action, its use is an "unwarranted
incursion into the Erie doctrine."221 The Moe court based its
conclusion on the idea that
even if Congress could constitutionally enact statutes to
govern the rights of parties in a given instance, it does not
necessarily follow that the Congress, in codifying the law
of evidence, may constitutionally enact a narrow statute
governing a single substantive issue in a lawsuit which is
215. Id. at 932.
216. Id. See also Note, Lev Dassin, Design Defects in the Rules Enabling Act:
The Misapplication of Federal Rule of Evidence 407 to Strict Liability, 65
N.Y.U. L. REV. 736, 759 (1990).
217. Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 932
(10th Cir. 1984).
218. Id. (citing Rexrode v. American Laundry Press Co., 674 F.2d 826, 831
(10th Cir. 1982)).
219. Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 932
(10th Cir. 1984).
220. See id.
221. Id.
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otherwise to be resolved by reference to state law.222
The rationale of Moe holds true, even after the recent
change in Rule 407, since the changes to the Rule were made
merely to adopt the majority rationale, as stated by the Sev-
enth Circuit in Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co. 223
D. The Rationale of the Seventh Circuit in Flaminio v. Honda
Motor Co.
The plaintiff in Flaminio made a similar argument, ar-
guing that state law provisions regarding admissibility of
evidence of evidence should be applied to a diversity action
based on state law. This argument was rejected by the Sev-
enth Circuit.22'4 Although the Flaminio court recognized the
policy argument that the sooner the remedial changes were
made, the less likely more people would be injured, it also
recognized that the defendant's costs in terms of liability may
rise symmetrically if the evidence of subsequent change is
admissible. 25  Additionally, the court found it likely that
large manufacturers were aware of the rules excluding sub-
sequent remedial measures, and this was considered when
making subsequent changes.2 6
With respect to forum shopping, the Flaminio court
stated that Rule 407 is "entwined" with procedural considera-
tions.22'7 Although the Advisory Committee Notes state that
Rule 407 was enacted to "encourag[e] people to take, or at
least not [to] discourag[e] them from taking, steps in further-
ance of added safety,"228 the Rule also has procedural consid-
erations.229
The Flaminio court found that Rule 407 had been en-
acted to limit the jury from overreacting to evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures, and thus make the improper infer-
ence of negligence from such evidence.23 ° Such overreactions
"could deter defendants from taking such remedial meas-
222. Id. at 933. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
223. See FED. R. EVID. 407; Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463 (7th
Cir. 1984).
224. Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.3d 463, 470 (7th Cir. 1984).
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. Id. at 471.
228. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 407 Advisory Committee Notes).
229. See Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 471 (7th Cir. 1984).
230. See id.
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ures:
23
1
[i]t is only because juries are believed to overreact to evi-
dence of subsequent remedial measures that the admissi-
bility of such evidence could deter defendants from taking
such measures. As the Advisory Committee and others
have argued ... to infer negligence from such measures is
to commit the fallacy, to which juries have long been
thought prone, of believing that 'because the world gets
wiser as it gets older, therefore it was foolish before.'232
The Flaminio court stated that since the tendency of a
jury to put too much emphasis on evidence of subsequent re-
pairs is a procedural judgment, Rule 407 is a procedural de-
vice designed to enhance the accuracy of the adjudicative
process.233  Because the rule has both procedural and sub-
stantive effects, making it "rationally capable or classification
as either" substantive or procedural, the Flaminio court
looked to precedent. It determined that the federal rule
should apply, since no rule promulgated under the Rules
Enabling Act234 has ever been invalidated.
2 1
However, this procedural concern is questionable since it
is based on the Rule as it was written to apply to a negligence
cause of action. The Flaminio court held that the Rule is
procedural since a jury's inference of "negligence" from sub-
sequent remedial measures "is to commit the fallacy ... of
believing that 'because the world gets wiser as it gets older,
therefore it was foolish before. 2 6 This rationale was consid-
ered by the Flaminio court to enhance the accuracy of the
237
adjudicative process.
This position of promoting fairness with regard to the de-
fendant loses its power in the context of a corporate manufac-
turer.238 Individual self-interest, so important in the decision
to protect individual tortfeasors from the evidence of subse-
quent change in negligence actions, is not present in a corpo-
231. See id.
232. Id. (quoting Hart v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry., 21 L.T.R. 261, 263 (Ex.
1869)).
233. See id. at 471.
234. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1997).
235. See Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 472 (7th Cir. 1984).
236. Id. at 471.
237. Id.
238. 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, JR., supra note 81.
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ration.239 Although there are many loyal employees of a cor-
poration,
[t]he person who orders the remedial measures may have
no knowledge of the facts of the accident and the person
involved in the accident may have no part in making the
repairs and his knowledge of corporate liability may be
such that it cannot be properly imputed to the employer.24°
Additionally, this argument of fairness must cut both
ways: to the plaintiff and the defendant.24' Consideration of
the plaintiff was made in Ault,242 and the California Supreme
Court held that the admission of such evidence allowed re-
covery to the plaintiff only to the extent that the ruling would
encourage the manufacturer to make repairs rather than face
additional plaintiffs.243
Finally, the rationale for the adoption of Rule 407 was
not based on a policy of fairness, but on the social policy of
encouraging, "or at least not excluding the taking of such
measures" under the policy of privilege. 244 Thus, evidence of
fairness should be considered in other contexts, but not in
consideration of Rule 407.245
V. PROPOSAL: APPLY CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE CODE § 1151 IN A
DIVERSITY ACTION BASED ON CALIFORNIA STRICT PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LAW
The Ninth Circuit should adopt a similar rationale con-
sistent with the rationale of the Tenth Circuit in Moe v. Avi-
ons Marcel Dassault-Bregeut Aviation. 46 Section 1151, which
permits the use of subsequent remedial measures in a strict
products liability action,247 defines the substantive policy goal
of safety in California.24 In a diversity action based on Cali-
239. See id.
240. Id.
241. See id.
242. Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Cal. 1974).
243. See id.
244. 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, JR., supra note 81.
245. See id.
246. 727 F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1984). Adoption of such a rationale would also
be consistent with the Ninth Circuit's holding in Olympic Sports. See supra
Part IV.A.
247. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1151 (West 1997).
248. See Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1151-52 (Cal.
1974).
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fornia law, California Evidence Code § 1151 should control. 49
Products liability is a state cause of action created by
state law.25° California has developed its own case law for de-
termining liability for defective products.2"' Under the Erie
doctrine, California's substantive law will be the underlying
law for a diversity action conducted in a federal court located
in California.252 To base an underlying claim on California
law, and apply a federal rule of evidence that is directly op-
posite of the policy goals of California, is to go against the
policy decisions of the state. Use of the federal rule also
creates an additional set of laws-a modified version of the
state law to be applied only in federal courts. This is con-
trary to the aims of the Erie doctrine, since the inconsistent
application of California law may encourage forum shopping
by defendants. 54
Also, the burdens of proof and requisite elements are
state created. 255 The Barker... court created a design defect
test under California law that is quite different than the
402A test used in Montana law in Gauthier.57 Contrary to
the holding of the Gauthier court, this difference is not one of
semantics.258 California's test of liability has clearly focused
on the product itself, and uses the consumer expectations test
249. To date, only one federal court in the Ninth Circuit has addressed
whether California Evidence Code § 1151 should apply in a diversity action.
See Fasanaro v. Mooney Aircraft Corp., 687 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Cal. 1988). In
Fasanaro, plaintiff sued defendant in a strict products liability action on the
theory that, inter alia, there were design defects in the defendant's aircraft.
See id. at 483. Upon plaintiffs voluntary dismissal of the Doe defendants in the
California state cause of action, defendant removed to district court, and moved
that evidence tending to show these design changes be excluded under Rule
407. See id. The Fasanaro court held that Rule 407 applied, adopting the
holding of Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.3d 463, 472 (7th Cir. 1984), that
since the Rule is arguably procedural, Rule 407 must be applied. Id. at 485.
250. See Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 932
(10th Cir. 1984).
251. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
252. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938).
253. See Note, Lev Dassin, Design Defects in The Rules Enabling Act: The
Misapplication of Federal Rule of Evidence 407 to Strict Liability, 65 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 736, 759 (1990).
254. See Olympic Sports Prod., Inc. v. Universal Athletic Sales Co., 760 F.2d
910, 914 (9th Cir. 1985).
255. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
256. Id.
257. Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634, 635-36 (9th Cir. 1986).
258. Id. at 637.
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as a minimum standard for determining liability of a manu-
facturer.2"9 Additionally, California has adopted an alterna-
tive test under which a manufacturer may still be held liable
even though the product met an ordinary consumer's expec-
tations.26 °  Under Barker, once a consumer establishes a
causal link between his injury and the product's design, the
burden of proof shifts to the manufacturer to prove the de-
sign is not defective.26' In a diversity action in California,
these policy decisions would be considered the law in a diver-
sity case since these decisions form the substantive law of the
underlying cause of action under Erie.262
California has chosen to follow the policy of admitting
evidence of subsequent remedial measures in a strict prod-
ucts liability action, a policy that is in harmony with its so-
cial goals of safety.263 In Ault,264 the court held that the policy
goal of Rule 407, i.e. controlling the use of such evidence to
limit any impermissible inferences of negligence by a jury,
had no comparable role in a strict products liability case.26'
California's policy to admit evidence of subsequent remedial
repairs in a strict products liability case promotes safety in
California.2 6  For this reason, the rule allowing such evidence
to be admitted becomes substantive law in the area of prod-
ucts liability in California.26 7 For a federal court in a diver-
sity action, where the underlying cause of action is based on
California law, to adopt a federal rule of evidence to the con-
trary is to selectively adopt the California law at the expense
of California's policy goal of promoting product safety. As the
Moe court indicated, to rely on the federal rule when Califor-
nia has announced a contrary position on this policy "is an
unwarranted incursion into the Erie doctrine." '268
259. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978).
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See Olympic Sports Prod., Inc. v. Universal Athletic Sales Co., 760 F.2d
910, 913 (9th Cir. 1985).
263. See Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1151-52(Cal.
1974).
264. Id.
265. See id. at 1152.
266. See id. See supra Part II.B.2.
267. See Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 932
(10th Cir. 1984).
268. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
We now revisit the hypothetical question posed at the
beginning of this comment: should the evidence of a subse-
quent remedial change to the gearbox be admitted against
International Harvester? The answer is yes.
In the area of products liability, California has developed
its own substantive law, which would constitute the under-
lying law in a diversity action located in California.26 9 Spe-
cifically, California has held that evidence of subsequent re-
medial measures is admissible to show liability in a strict
products liability case."' This is a policy decision made by
California to promote product safety.2 ' Therefore, although
Federal Rule of Evidence 407 explicitly prohibits the use of
such evidence to show liability, California Evidence Code
Section 1151 should be applied in a diversity case based on
California law in order to promote the state's policy of prod-
uct safety. Thus, evidence of subsequent remedial repairs
should also be admissible in a diversity action based on Cali-
fornia law, in order to effect the policy decisions of California
in the area of products liability,"2 and to discourage forum
shopping under the Erie doctrine.73
Daniel Ogburn
269. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978). See also infra
Part I.
270. See Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1151-52 (Cal.
1974). See also supra Part I.
271. See id.
272. See supra Part V.
273. See supra Part V.A.
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